Betting on Quantum Objects by Steeger, Jeremy
Betting on Quantum Objects
Jeremy Steeger
July 28, 2017
Abstract
Dutch book arguments have been applied to beliefs about the outcomes of mea-
surements of quantum systems, but not to beliefs about quantum objects prior to
measurement. In this paper, we prove a quantum version of the probabilists’ Dutch
book theorem that applies to both sorts of beliefs: roughly, if ideal beliefs are given by
vector states, all and only Born-rule probabilities avoid Dutch books. This theorem
and associated results have implications for operational and realist interpretations of
the logic of a Hilbert lattice. In the latter case, we show that the defenders of the
eigenstate-value orthodoxy face a trilemma. Those who favor vague properties avoid
the trilemma, admitting all and only those beliefs about quantum objects that avoid
Dutch books.
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1 Introduction
Judging the rationality of beliefs about the quantum world is a hard problem. To address
it, it seems it might be useful to appeal to a general principle long thought to serve as a
necessary condition for any sort of belief to be rational: the avoidance of Dutch books.
Bayesians often use the avoidance of Dutch books, or betting strategies that cause an agent
to lose money no matter what the world is like, as a litmus test for the rationality of belief.
This test already has a breadth of applications. Recent works by Paris (2001) and Mundici
(2006), to name but a few, have applied a generalized version of the classic synchronic
Dutch book argument to beliefs in the propositions of various nonclassical logics. Not
among these logics are those of Hilbert lattices (these will be detailed in Section 3). The
formal language of Hilbert-lattice logics may be used to straightforwardly describe either of
two sorts of quantum phenomena. Propositions in this language may refer to the outcomes
of measurements of quantum systems, on the one hand, or to the properties of quantum
objects underlying these outcomes, on the other.1 It is the project of this paper to apply
the generalized Dutch book argument to the logics of Hilbert lattices. In accordance with
the two ways these logics may be used, this application provides a means for assessing
both beliefs about outcomes and beliefs about objects.
Dutch book arguments have thus far been applied to the former sort of beliefs but not
to the latter.2 The absence of such arguments is understandable—it is not immediately
clear what quantum objects might look like, in the first place! Much of the difficulty in
picturing quantum objects stems from the Kochen-Specker theorem. Kochen and Specker
proved fifty years ago that there can be no hidden variable theory underlying the possible
outcomes of measurements of quantum systems that both uniquely determines these out-
comes and renders them independent of the context of measurement (1967).3 In particular,
there can be no assignment of sharp and context-independent values for properties such
that these values are faithfully revealed by measurement. Consider the simple proof of
these results offered by Cabello and collaborators, illustrated in Figure 1 (1996). A given
node corresponds to possible values that may be observed for certain spin properties of two
entangled electrons. Each box stands in for a measurement context, a maximal set mea-
surements that can be simultaneously performed. Whenever a box is measured, precisely
1By “quantum objects” we mean, quite simply, the referents of expressions such as “electron” or
“proton”—particles whose properties are often taken to be represented by bounded, self-adjoint operators
on a Hilbert space. Our notion of object is quite thin. We do not impose objects satisfy Leibniz’s Law, or
any variant of it. For work addressing questions of discernibility in this context, see Saunders’s argument
(2006) and Hawley’s response (2006).
2As far as this author can tell, in any case.
3In this paper, we use “contextuality” to refer exclusively to dependence on the context of measurement,
and not on the context of preparation or transformation; these latter sorts of dependence are explored by
Spekkens (2005).
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Figure 1: Cabello and collaborators’ 18-vector proof of the Kochen-Specker result. A white
coloring for a node represents an assignment of 0 (impossible); a black coloring represents
an assignment of 1 (possible). No coloring will yield precisely one black node for each box;
one such failed coloring is shown.
one node in the box will assign the values observed. If we take measurement to reveal
property-values that do not depend on context, then no consistent global assignment of
values can be given.
The shock brought on by the impossibility of such an assignment is aptly reflected in
subsequent approaches to both quantum logic and Bayesian methods in quantum founda-
tions. A full and just review of the literature is well beyond the scope of this paper (let
alone its introduction), but it suffices to point to a few highlights. Randall and Foulis
(1976), for instance, present a strongly operational Bayesian approach. They prove that
Born-rule beliefs about outcomes of measurements satisfy a no-Dutch-book condition (we
will return to this result in Section 5). The authors use symbols that refer to physical
operations (“well-defined physically realizable, reproducible procedure[s]”) and outcomes ;
there is never any mention of the properties of unseen objects prior to measurement (1976,
p. 170). Randall and Foulis’s disavowal of such properties, if not their operationalism per
se, was echoed decades later in Pitowsky’s work on “quantum gambles”—strategies for bet-
ting on the outcomes of incompatible measurements, only one of which is to be performed
by a bookie. In this work, the outcomes of measurements are treated as mere possibilities
“[not associated] with properties that exist prior to the act of measurement” (2003, p.
408).
Meanwhile, logicians set about developing realist semantics for Hilbert-lattice logics
that do refer to such properties. Putnam’s proposal is perhaps the most infamous. On
this proposal, for every box in Figure 1, the disjunction of all the property-ascriptions
contained in that box is true and only one of the disjuncts is true. Putnam appears
to maintain that the truth of these disjuncts does not depend on measurement context,
asserting just that (since we can only measure one box at a time) we may be ignorant as
to which disjunct is the true one (1968, p. 186). Quite clearly, this prescription runs afoul
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of the Kochen-Specker setup in the figure. No such truth valuation exists!
But the failure of Putnam’s proposal does not demonstrate that no noncontextual, real-
ist semantics for quantum logics are forthcoming. There are, after all, extant proposals for
interpreting quantum mechanics as a theory about the properties of observer-independent
objects that do not run afoul of the Kochen-Specker result. The eigenstate-value link is
perhaps the oldest. More recently, a proposal using vague properties has been developed
(Lewis 2016; Pykacz 2015). Each of these proposals may be perspicuously described as
truth-value semantics for Hilbert-lattice logics (this exercise will be conducted explicitly
in Section 6).
Pitowsky suggests that Putnam’s approach comes with “a heavy price-tag: the repudi-
ation of classical [propositional] logic” (2003, p. 408). Insofar as we continue to work with
Hilbert-lattice logics, the proposals sketched here follow Putnam in this “repudiation.”
But it is far from clear that classical propositional logic is threatened by its failure to
describe an ontology of quantum objects with certain properties. One may well think that
this familiar logic has a vast domain of applicability in metaphysics, which applicability is
not particularly troubled by a nonclassical attitude towards the quantum. The supposed
repudiation, then, may be quite inexpensive.
Given this plausible lack of expense—and given the utility of object-talk in homespun
metaphysical practice—it seems natural to wonder about the rationality of the beliefs
the sketched proposals suggest we have about the properties of quantum objects prior to
measurement. Certainly, these properties are inaccessible to us. We let go of the idea that
a bookie can always be some human able to look at the results on which bets hinge, and
consider the bookie as some hypothetical entity who always has perfect knowledge of the
quantum system. That done, we are free to use the generalized synchronic Dutch book
argument as an in-principle rationality constraint to assess our beliefs about quantum
objects in addition to our beliefs about the outcomes of measurements of them.
We apply this constraint by proving a quantum probabilism theorem. Treating the
projection lattice P(H) of a finite-dimensional Hilbert space H as a quantum logic, if the
possible ideal beliefs an agent should have regarding propositions in P(H) are given by the
restrictions of vector states to the lattice, then the Born-rule probabilities are all and only
the total belief functions avoiding Dutch books. This theorem extends previous results
due to Kühr and Mundici, described in Section 2, in a novel direction (2007). Section 3
provides a brief primer on the Hilbert-lattice formalism used for our quantum logics, and
Section 4 presents the proof of the main theorem.
We proceed in Section 5 to demonstrate how an analogue of the operationalist Dutch
book result of Randall and Foulis can be recovered in our framework. In Section 6, we
complete the translation of our realist proposals into semantics for quantum logics, and
we use our main theorem to assess vague-property semantics.
Finally, in Section 7, we show that the defenders of the eigenstate-value orthodoxy
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face a trilemma. They must choose one of: not using Born’s rule to fix agents’ beliefs;
suggesting agents have no degree of belief in many property-ascriptions; or leaving agents
susceptible to Dutch books. Those who favor vague properties avoid this trilemma, ad-
mitting all and only those beliefs about quantum objects that avoid Dutch books. Section
8 suggests directions for future work. Proofs of all results can be found in the appendix.
2 Generalizing Dutch-bookability for quantum logics
The heart of the generalized synchronic Dutch book argument is a game played by an agent
and a bookie, a betting arrangement testing the agent’s beliefs about the state of the world.
The state of the world is some assignment of truth values to a set of propositions, L. Not
all propositions may be assigned truth values, so we take a state of affairs to be a partial
function T : L → N , where N is a set of truth values. T will denote the set of states of
affairs; these are the subjects of the agent’s beliefs and the bookie’s knowledge.
We focus on a certain sort of doxastic attitude an agent may have regarding a propo-
sition φ ∈ L, namely the agent’s degree of belief or degree of confidence in φ. Following
standard Bayesian approach, we assume that if an agent has a degree of belief in φ,
then this degree may be represented by some value in the unit interval (Ramsey 1931;
Smith 2014). We say the agent’s degrees of belief are given by some partial function
B : L → [0, 1]; the function is partial to allow for cases where an agent withholds belief.
Note there is a question of how an agent should fix her degree of confidence in a proposition
that she suspects is neither true nor false. We return to this issue in Sections 5–7.
The bookie, for her part, assigns stakes si ∈ R to each proposition φi ∈ L, and is
presumed to have perfect knowledge of the state of the world. Given this knowledge, the
bookie then decides what the agent’s ideal degree of belief in a proposition should be. In
the classical case, this decision is straightforward: if a proposition is true, the agent should
have degree of belief one in it; if it is false, the agent should have degree of belief zero
in it. But propositions may be ascribed esoteric truth values in non-bivalent logics, and
so the decision is not always as clear. We thus make the decision explicit by assigning
to each state of affairs T a partial function VT : L → [0, 1] describing what the agent’s
ideal beliefs should be in this case. Following Bradley, we call this function a cognitive
evaluation (2016). V will denote the set of all such evaluations.
If the bookie decides the agent should not have any degree of belief in propositions
in some subset of L, then VT will be partial. In other words, the bookie will not agree
to betting arrangements concerning propositions for which VT is undefined. To identify
subsets of L on which she will accept bets, we stipulate that a set of propositions Γ ⊂ L
is testable if there is some VT ∈ V such that Γ is included in the domain of VT .
Now suppose our bookie sets some nonnegative stake si ≥ 0 for the proposition φi.
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Given our agent has degree of belief B(φi) in φi, we suppose that the agent is willing to
pay the bookie B(φi) · si for the si-dollar bet on φi. The bookie will pay out si · VT (φi)
assuming T describes the state of the world. We also allow “reverse bets.” For negative
stakes si < 0, if the agent agrees to the bet, then the bookie pays the agent B(φi) · |si|, and
the agent must pay VT (φi) · |si| when the bookie comes to collect. Now suppose there is
some finite, testable set of propositions Γ = {φ1, . . . , φn} and an ordered set of stakes the
bookie can give them, 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 ∈ Rn, such that for all V ∈ V whose domain includes
Γ,
n∑
i=1
si(V (φi)−B(φi)) < 0; (1)
the agent will always lose money to the bookie when she places her bets on the propositions
in Γ. Thus, we say that if there are sets Γ and 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 satisfying equation (1) for a
belief function B given cognitive evaluations V, then B is Dutch-bookable, or fails to avoid
Dutch books.4
This betting game suggests a tight link between coherent beliefs and the convex hull
of the cognitive evaluations, co(V). This is the set of all finite convex sums of such
evaluations, finite linear sums of V ∈ V where the coefficients are nonnegative and sum to
one. Kühr and Mundici (2007) demonstrate that so long as V contains only total functions
and is closed under pointwise convergence, a total belief function B avoids Dutch books
if and only if it lives in the pointwise-closure of the convex hull of V, co(V).5
Theorem 1. [Theorem 2.3 in Kühr and Mundici (2007)] For V pointwise-
closed in [0, 1]L, a belief function B ∈ [0, 1]L does not admit a Dutch book if
and only if B ∈ co(V).
We include a proof of this result in the appendix in order to demonstrate the proceeding
corollaries.
To establish our quantum probabilism theorem, we make use of an easy corollary
exploiting Krein and Milman’s result that, for suitable spaces, a compact, convex set A is
equal to the closed convex hull of its extremal elements ∂A.6 The extremal elements, ∂A,
are just those elements of A that cannot be expressed as a finite convex sum of more than
one element of A. Thus:
4Paris demonstrates that this condition generalizes that used in de Finetti’s original synchronic Dutch
book argument (Paris 2001; de Finetti 1990).
5Recall a set F of functions f : X → Y is closed under pointwise convergence if, for any net {fi} in
F that converges pointwise to f , f is in F ; a net {fi} converges pointwise to f if, for all x ∈ X and all
 > 0, there is some i′ such that for all i ≥ i′, |fi(x) − f(x)| < . The closure co(V) is just the smallest
pointwise-closed set containing co(V).
6This holds for Hausdorff, locally convex topological vector spaces, and so for any [0, 1]L embedded
in RL with the product topology. Since [0, 1]L is compact, any closed subset of it is compact in RL.
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Figure 2: An illustration of Corollary 1.1 for a language L containing two propositions, φ
and ψ.
Corollary 1.1. [Proposition 3.1 in Kühr and Mundici (2007)] For V pointwise-
closed in [0, 1]L, if A ⊆ [0, 1]L is pointwise-closed and convex, V ⊆ A and
∂A ⊆ V, then B ∈ [0, 1]L avoids Dutch books if and only if B ∈ A.
This corollary is illustrated for L containing two propositions in Figure 2, where A is the
oval and its interior, ∂A is the oval, and V is the oval and the shaded region. In Section
4, we take A to be the set of Born-rule probabilities evaluated over the propositions in
a Hilbert-lattice logic and V = ∂A to be the set of vector states evaluated over these
propositions (these concepts will be detailed in Section 3).
We are also concerned to address beliefs which may not live in co(V), but are possibly
countably infinite convex sums of elements of V. Fortunately, the “if” direction of Theorem
1 holds in this case, even when V is not pointwise-closed.
Corollary 1.2. A belief function B ∈ [0, 1]L does not admit a Dutch book if
B is a convex sum of elements of V.
Finally, when establishing the trilemma facing the eigenstate-value link in Section 7,
we will make use of the following generalization of the “only if” direction of Theorem 1.
Corollary 1.3. If there is some finite Γ ⊆ L over which B is defined such
that co({V Γ | V ∈ V}) is pointwise-closed and does not contain BΓ, then B
is Dutch-bookable.
Kühr and Mundici apply these results to any logic whose connectives may be ex-
pressed as continuous operations on [0, 1] and to generalized multi-value algebras. Our
quantum probabilism theorem extends these results in a different direction, applying them
to Hilbert-lattice logics.
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What this application means, however, will of course depend on how one decides to
interpret the formal language of such a logic. In order to motivate our two ways of inter-
preting Hilbert-lattice logics—as describing outcomes of measurements, on the one hand,
and as describing properties of objects, on the other—we turn briefly to the mathematical
foundations of quantum mechanics.
3 Operational and realist interpretations
Quantum mechanics, like its classical predecessor, is a physical theory that describes states
of a system and the observable quantities or observables of this system. But quantum me-
chanics seems to disturb the tight link in classical Hamiltonian mechanics between states
and the values of observables. Schrödinger’s wave function Ψ describes the state of a
quantum system, but it only fixes distributions over the possible values of observables.
Born’s rule takes the square-integral of the distribution specified by Ψ over some interval
of an observable’s possible values to specify the probability of finding the system to have
a value for the observable in that interval. Associating states with certain preperations
of systems, these Born-rule values match the frequencies we observe for measurements on
many identically-prepared systems. But exactly what to say about the values of observ-
ables before measurement remains a puzzle.
We consider two divergent attitudes one may adopt in deciding what to say. The
operational attitude associates states only with preparations. On this attitude, we take
the language of our logics to describe measurement outcomes. The realist attitude remains
optimistic that we might be able to salvage a tight link between states and observable
quantities prior to measurement. On this attitude, we take the language of our logics to
describe objects and their properties.7
A language for these logics naturally arises from the set of projections P(H) on a
separable Hilbert space H equipped with an inner product 〈·, ·〉.8 H is the vector space
of square-integrable functions, and so we treat each wave function Ψ as a vector η ∈ H.
Each observable is associated with an operator in the set B(H) of bounded operators on
H. There is an adjoint map ∗ on operators such that 〈η, Aη′〉 = 〈A∗η, η′〉, and we stipulate
that A ∈ B(H) is an observable if and only if A = A∗. The projections P(H) are just the
idempotent observables. For B(R) the set of all Borel subsets of the real line, we associate
with each self-adjoint operator A ∈ B(H) a unique function PA : B(R) → P(H) via the
spectral theorem. In this formalism, the Born rule takes the inner product 〈η, PA(a)η〉
7On our realist approaches, we will consider ontologies where states of preparation determine truth
values for propositions about observable quantities prior to measurement. One may well desire a more
relaxed realist approach whereon preparation states determine only a distribution over more general ontic
states. For such an approach, see Spekkens’s ontological models framework (2005).
8The proceeding description of Hilbert-lattice logics is primarily based on Rédei’s account (1998).
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to yield the probability for observable A to have a value within the Borel set a when the
system is in state η ∈ H.
To capture uncertainty about what state describes how a system was prepared, we use a
density operator, ρ. For some countable sequence {ηi}i∈I of states in H, ρ :=
∑
i pi|ηi〉〈ηi|,
where pi ≥ 0 for all i,
∑
i pi = 1, and |·〉〈·| denotes the Hilbert space’s outer product. We
may take each pi to correspond to an agent’s degree of confidence that the system was
prepared in the state ηi. If the agent knows ηi describes how the system was prepared,
then pi = 1, and we say ρ is pure. An agent may thus always express these beliefs with
a function on the projections B : P(H) → [0, 1] :: φ 7→ Tr(ρφ). We call such functions
Born-rule probabilities and denote the set of these probabilities by B. If ρ is a pure state
we say the Born-rule probability it induces is a Born-rule state. The set of these we write
as VB.
The set of projections is a propositional language, as it is closed under the logical
connectives when these are interpreted as the lattice operations of P(H) viewed as a
Hilbert lattice. Consider a countable set of projections {φi}i∈I with ranges {Gi}i∈I . Let
conjunction be the lattice meet
∧
i φi, which is the projection onto the intersection
⋂
i Gi.
Let disjunction be the lattice join
∨
i φi, which is the projection onto the closed linear
subspace spanned by the Gi. Finally, let the negation ¬φ be the projection onto the set of
vectors orthogonal to all vectors in the range of φ. We denote entailment by the partial
order ≤H, where φ ≤H ψ just in case the range of φ is included in the range of ψ, and
φ ≡H ψ just in case φ ≤H ψ and ψ ≤H φ. Under this equivalence, P(H) is closed under
arbitrary conjunctions, disjunctions, and negations.
Now we consider what the operationalist and the realist take the propositions in P(H)
to be. Each φ ∈ P(H) induces an equivalence class of pairs of observables and Borel
subsets {(Aα, aα)} such that PAα(aα) are all the same projection. We say an operational
interpretation of P(H) takes φ to be the proposition:
After measurement, the values of {Aα} for the system lie in {aα}, respectively.
The sentence φ makes a claim about the system immediately after the performance of
a measurement. Moreover, as we will see in Section 5, we can choose states of affairs
such that φ is meaningful just in case the properties it references were, in fact, measured.
Thus, our operationalist need only ascribe to the system those property-values that are
associated with the observed outcomes of actual measurements.
By contrast, realist interpretations of P(H) take φ to make a claim about a system
unperturbed by measurement. We say a classical-realist interpretation takes φ to be the
proposition:
The values of {Aα} for the system lie in {aα}, respectively.
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This approach mirrors the usual interpretation of observable quantities in classical me-
chanics, taking ascriptions of values for observables like position or momentum to literally
be ascribing position-values and momentum-values to objects in the system. We say the
dispositional-realist interpretation takes φ to be the proposition:
The system is disposed to yield a value of {Aα} in {aα} upon measurement of
{Aα}, respectively.
The relevant properties picked out by this proposition are dispositions of objects in the
system to have certain values for other properties once the appropriate measurement is
made.
Our two realist interpretations do not invoke deep metaphysical commitments. There
is quite a bit of flexibility regarding how one interprets the properties ascribed by either
sort of proposition. We do impose that the properties ascribed by φ on a dispositional-
realist interpretation are dispositional. However, a property ascribed by some φ on a
classical-realist interpretation, such as position, may be taken to be categorical or rela-
tional. Moreover, the property ascribed by PA(a) on either realist interpretation may be
taken to be possessed by an individual particle referenced by the observable A, or it may
be taken to be possessed by the whole system to which this particle belongs. Finally,
while we talk quite explicitly of objects and the properties they possess, this talk certainly
should not be taken to rule out various bundle-theoretic accounts of objects. The follow-
ing arguments apply to any and all of these various ways of fleshing out the metaphysical
accounts sketched by either of our realist interpretations of a quantum logic.
To complete the semantics for Hilbert-lattice logics on one of the above realist interpre-
tations, we will define a set of states of affairs T and use the standard Tarskian condition
to define entailment ≤T. Namely, for φ, ψ ∈ P(H), we define
φ ≤T ψ ⇐⇒ ∀ T ∈ T [T (φ) = 1⇒ T (ψ) = 1]. (2)
For operational semantics, we consider a variant of Tarskian entailment that tracks all the
possible inferences between meaningful propositions:
φ ≤T ψ ⇐⇒ ∀ T ∈ T [T (φ) = 1 and T (ψ) defined⇒ T (ψ) = 1] ∧
∃ T ∈ T [T (φ) = T (ψ) = 1]. (3)
On either definition of entailment, we will require truth-value semantics to be sound and
complete. That is, ≤T should align with ≤H. When this holds, the equivalence relations
they induce also align. Truth will preserve our existing notions of entailment and sameness
of meaning.
In Sections 5 and 6, we apply this semantically-driven approach to the operational and
realist interpretations of P(H), respectively, and assess the Dutch-bookability of beliefs on
the resulting logics. But first, we complete the proof of the promised quantum probabilism
theorem that applies to beliefs for these logics given either sort of interpretation.
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4 Quantum probabilism in finite dimensions
Our quantum probabilism theorem is the following claim: for any quantum logic P(H)
with dim(H) <∞, if we take the cognitive evaluations to be the Born-rule states VB, then
the Born-rule probabilities B are all and only the total belief functions avoiding Dutch
books. The proof of this theorem relies on the topological properties of states on B(H),
and so this section is more technical than the others; the reader interested in applications
may skip to Section 5.
Recall that a state on B(H) is a normalized, positive linear functional ω : B(H)→ C;
that is, ω(1) = 1 for the identity element 1 ∈ B(H) and ω(A∗A) ≥ 0 for all A ∈ B(H). Let
E be the set of all states in the space B(H)∗ of continuous linear functionals on B(H); by
their linearity, these states are finitely additive.9 E is convex and compact in B(H)∗ with
the weak∗ topology, the topology of pointwise convergence for linear functionals (Bratteli
and Robinson 1987, p. 53). We refer to the extremal elements of this set, ∂E , as pure
states; when H is finite-dimensional, the set of pure states is also weakly∗ closed (Kadison
and Ringrose 1991, p. 203).
To ensure that states behave like probabilities, we would like to consider just those
states that are completely additive over sets of mutually orthogonal projections. We say
such states are normal. These are just those states that can be expressed as Tr(ρ−) for
some density operator ρ (Kadison and Ringrose 1983, p. 462). Let N denote the set of all
normal states in B(H)∗. When dim(H) < ∞, it is immediate that all states are normal,
since finite additivity implies complete additivity.
For any B(H), N is convex and ∂N is the set of vector states, states of the form
ωη : B(H) → C :: A 7→ 〈η, Aη〉 for η a unit vector in H (Alfsen and Shultz 2012, p.
177). For dim(H) < ∞, ∂N coincides with ∂E , and so all pure states may be expressed
as Tr(ρ−) for some pure density operator ρ.
Finally, note that the restriction of the domain of states on B(H) to the set of projec-
tions P(H) is a map into the Tychonoff cube [0, 1]P(H):
r : E → [0, 1]P(H) :: ω 7→ ωP(H), (4)
where E is given the subspace topology generated by the weak∗ topology on B(H)∗, and
so is compact. Note that r(N ) and r(∂N ) are just the Born-rule probabilities B and
Born-rule states VB, respectively. We use this fact to prove our main theorem.
Theorem 2. For dim(H) < ∞, a total belief function B on a quantum logic
P(H) with cognitive evaluations VB avoids Dutch books if and only if B ∈ B.
9Here, a state is finitely additive just in case
∑n
i=1 ω(φi) = ω (
∨n
i=1 φi) for mutually orthogonal φi.
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The proof, included in the appendix, proceeds by showing that r is an injective, convexity-
preserving closed map, and so r(E) is closed and convex, r(∂E) is closed, and r(∂E) =
∂r(E). The result then directly follows from Corollary 1.1.
Furthermore, since every normal state is a convex sum of vector states, it is immediate
from Corollary 1.2 that Born-rule probabilities always avoid Dutch books for cognitive
evaluations VB.
Corollary 2.1. A belief function B on a quantum logic P(H) with cognitive
evaluations VB avoids Dutch books if B ∈ B.
So long as vector states capture ideal beliefs, then, the Born-rule beliefs avoid Dutch books
even when complete and finite additivity do not align.
These results may be applied directly to operational and realist interpretations of the
Hilbert-lattice logic P(H). We consider an operational interpretation first, recovering an
analogue of Randall and Foulis’s result.
5 Operational quantum logics on semantic approach
It is natural for an operationalist to suggest that a suitable bookie must always have the
potential to be an actual person. The bookie, then, should determine the ideal beliefs
VT ∈ V from the outcomes of a measured system. A human bookie in such a situation
will never be able to assign a cognitive evaluation VT that is defined for propositions φ
and ψ that reference incompatible observables A and B, because it is impossible for these
observables to be measured simultaneously.
Thus, one option for the operationalist is to take each function T ∈ T and each function
V ∈ V to be defined only for some maximal set A of commuting projections in P(H).
Consider, for instance, the following toy example of an operational proposition: “After
measurement, the electron has spin up in the z-direction.” We take this proposition to be
meaningful, and so to have a truth value, just in case the electron’s spin in the z-direction
was measured. Each A represents a maximal set of compatible measurements. Thus, each
T ∈ T will be defined for some maximal set of meaningful sentences.
Operational outcomes. Every yes-no question in some maximal set of commut-
ing projections has a definite answer. Let TO be the set of all functions
Tη,A(φ) =

0 if 〈η, φη〉 = 0, φ ∈ A
1 if 〈η, φη〉 = 1, φ ∈ A
undefined otherwise
for φ ∈ P(H), A ⊂ P(H) the maximal set of commuting projections generated
by {|ηi〉〈ηi|} for {ηi} an orthonormal basis, and η ∈ {ηi}.
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If we let TO specify the entailment relation ≤O for our language L by the modified Tarskian
condition (3), then it is not difficult to show that φ ≤O ψ if and only if φ ≤H ψ, as desired.
As we noted in Section 2, allowing propositions that are neither true nor false creates
two interpretive issues, one for the set of cognitive evaluations and one for the agent’s belief-
forming strategy. Rather than trying to resolve the former issue definitively, we identify
three plausible constraints on ideal beliefs. First, an agent should not hold differing degrees
of belief in propositions assigned the same truth value. Second, she should have no degree
of belief in meaningless propositions. Third, she should fully believe in true propositions
and have no confidence in false ones. We gather these constraints under the heading of
weak truth-fealty.
Weak truth-fealty. For all T ∈ T, the following are satisfied.
1. If T (φ) = T (ψ) then either VT (φ) = VT (ψ) or both are undefined.
2. If T (φ) is undefined then VT (φ) is undefined.
3. If T (φ) = 1 then VT (φ) = 1 and if T (φ) = 0 then VT (φ) = 0.
Recall VT (φ) is undefined when the agent should ideally withhold judgment about φ.
Given weak truth-fealty and states of affairs TO, the ideal beliefs VO are uniquely fixed:
VO := {VT | T ∈ TO}, where VT = T.
We also must address how an agent should form degrees of confidence in propositions
she suspects are neither true nor false. Given the propositions in P(H) on operational
interpretation concern only observed outcomes, we naturally suggest that an agent use
the empirically-verified Born rule to fix her beliefs. Explicitly, the agent should choose
a suitable belief function B ∈ B given her degrees of confidence regarding which state
describes how the system was prepared. We will subsequently refer to this belief-forming
strategy as Born-fixing.
As Randall and Foulis have noted at greater length, given Born-fixing, operational
quantum logics should avoid Dutch books. These authors use test spaces, a set-theoretic
setting for operational probabilities, to establish necessary and sufficient conditions for
satisfying a no-Dutch-book condition defined in terms of betting pools (1976, p. 193).
However, we may quickly review the main result of interest for our purposes—that, on the
above operational semantics, all Born-rule probabilities avoid synchronic Dutch books—
using our current setup.
Proposition 3. A belief function B ∈ [0, 1]P(H) given cognitive evaluations
VO avoids Dutch books if B ∈ B.
This result is immediate from Corollary 2.1, as for each testable Γ ⊂ P(H) given cognitive
evaluations VO, the set of V Γ for V ∈ VO defined over Γ is is simply a subset of the set
of V Γ for V ∈ VB.
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As discussed in the introduction, we now abandon the idea that a bookie always has
the potential to be some human who can check outcomes. Instead, we imagine our bookie
as some hypothetical entity that has perfect knowledge of the state of a quantum system
before measurement. We may now use the Dutch book argument as one means of assessing
the plausibility of our two candidate ontologies of quantum objects: the eigenstate-value
link and the vague-properties approach.
6 Realist approaches and the coherence of vague prop-
erties
In order to apply Dutch books to these ontologies, we detail ways the proponent of the
eigenstate-value link and the vague-property theorist may describe states of affairs T and
cognitive evaluations V for their Hilbert-lattice logics. Each of these may, in principle, be
applied to both the classical-realist and dispositional-realist interpretations of the proposi-
tional calculus P(H). However, the eigenstate-value link is traditionally stated as a claim
about classical-realist property-ascriptions, and we will default to this interpretation when
discussing it.
Loosely, the link says that a system has a sharp or definite value for an observable if
and only if it is in an eigenstate of that observable. A state η is said to be in an eigenstate
of an observable A with eigenvalue λ ∈ C if Aη = λη. On a first pass, then, the link
asserts that given a system in the state η, the proposition “the value of A for the system is
λ” is true just in case Aη = λη, false just in case Aη = λ′η for some λ′ 6= λ, and otherwise
indeterminate.
There is a small technical hurdle. We have assumed that H is separable and we have
used the spectrum of an observable to represent its possible values. On this approach,
observables like position or momentum have no eigenvalues, and so the eigenstate-value
rule gives us no guidance for propositions regarding these observables (Rédei 1998, p. 12).
Thus, we apply the eigenstate-value link just to projections, the propositions in our logics.
If a system is in the state η, the proposition “the value of A for the system lies in a” has
a definite answer just in case 〈η, PA(a)η〉 is zero or one.
This statement of the link does not provide much guidance on how to treat φ when
〈η, φη〉 is neither zero nor one. We identify two approaches the defender of the link might
have in mind. First, one might suggest in such cases that the proposition φ is ill-formed,
that it has no meaning. One may plausibly ascribe this attitude to Dirac, who suggests
the link yields a “restricted meaning for an observable ‘having a value’” (1958, p. 47).10
We might model this attitude with the following states of affairs.
10Gilton (2016) gives an overview of approaches to the eigenstate-value link espoused by Dirac, Bohm,
and von Neumann, among others.
14
Eigenstate-value properties (restricted). Many yes-no questions lack meaning.
For φ ∈ P(H), let
TR = {Tη | η ∈ H, ||η|| = 1}, Tη(φ) =

0 if 〈η, φη〉 = 0
1 if 〈η, φη〉 = 1
undefined otherwise.
Using the standard Tarskian condition (2) to define ≤R, we see straightaway that φ ≤R ψ
if and only if φ ≤H ψ. Weak truth-fealty uniquely fixes the cognitive evaluations VR.
But this approach seems unpalatable. We say that cognitive evaluations restrict ex-
pression when they suggest an agent should not form beliefs about φ when 〈η, φη〉 is
neither zero nor one. Given such restriction, agents cannot have any degree of confidence
whatsoever in many expressions regarding the quantum world. The cognitive evaluations
in VR clearly restrict expression.
More drastically, this approach implies that propositions ascribing properties to the
system gain or lose meaning depending on the state in which the system was prepared.
Such contingency of meaning is coherent, perhaps, but it strains intuitions regarding
property-ascribing propositions. A change in the weather, one would think, may affect the
truth of my assertion that it is raining outside—but surely it cannot make this assertion
unintelligible.
When applying states of affairs TO to an operationalist interpretation of P(H), we
had a principled reason for both restriction of expression and contingency of meaning. In
line with the operationalist’s quietist attitude, we required that property-values only be
ascribed based on outcomes of performed measurements. For realist interpretations, we
venture to treat property-ascriptions quite independently of what measurements are made,
and so it is not clear this principle can still be used to cogently justify these constraints.
Thus, we turn to a milder interpretation of the eigenstate-value link. On this second
approach, we suggest that if 〈η, φη〉 is neither zero nor one, then the proposition φ is
meaningful, but it is sent to a truth value that is neither true nor false. This option is
modeled by the states of affairs TE defined below. We will turn to the question of what
an agent’s belief-forming strategy for this semantics should be in Section 7. Presently, we
note that, assuming weak truth-fealty, agents must either have some constant degree of
belief c ∈ [0, 1] in indeterminate propositions or must withhold belief in such propositions,
modeled by letting c be undefined.
Eigenstate-value properties (unrestricted). Many yes-no questions have the
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answer “indeterminate.” For φ ∈ P(H), let
TE = {Tη | η ∈ H, ||η|| = 1}, Tη(φ) =

0 if 〈η, φη〉 = 0
1 if 〈η, φη〉 = 1
2 otherwise
and let
VE := {VT | T ∈ TE}, VT (φ) =

0 if T (φ) = 0
1 if T (φ) = 1
c if T (φ) = 2
for either c ∈ [0, 1] or c undefined.
We again use (2) to define ≤E. For φ, ψ ∈ P(H), φ ≤E ψ if and only if φ ≤H ψ, as
desired. This position is presumably what Wallace has in mind in his recent explication of
the eigenstate-value link, given that he suggests it ascribes “completely indefinite positions”
to “all realistic quantum systems” (2012, p. 4580).
We need not assign all indeterminate propositions the same truth value, however. A
more fine-grained description of indeterminate propositions is afforded by vague properties.
Vague properties. Many yes-no questions have vague answers. Let
TV = {Tη | η ∈ H, ||η|| = 1}, Tη(φ) = 〈η, φη〉
for φ ∈ P(H).
Again assuming (2), for all φ, ψ ∈ P(H), φ ≤V ψ if and only if φ ≤H ψ.
The vague properties approach takes the Born-rule states to stipulate degrees of truth
of realist propositions such as “the electron has an x-position value in the Borel set a”
or “the electron gives rise to an x-position value in the Borel set a when its x-position
is measured.” Such propositions are assigned a degree of truth equal to their Born-rule
value given the state in which the system was prepared. Loose talk of an electron being a
“cloud,” or having a “smear” of position values, is here given a precise formulation as the
application of states of affairs TV to a classical-realist interpretation of P(H). Just as we
may choose to say that “the man is bald” is only somewhat true if the man in question is
balding but has tufts of hair around his ears, we say that it is only somewhat true that the
electron is located at any given position at a given moment. More extensive treatments
of this approach have been provided by, among others, Lewis (2016) and Pykacz (2015).
Given such states of affairs, there is a ready strategy for how agents should form degrees
of belief in the vague propositions in P(H). We simply suppose that an agent should be
precisely as confident in a proposition as the degree to which she expects it is true; this
16
expectation may be expressed by a suitable convex sum of truth valuations.11 We call
this strategy truth-fixing. On vague-property semantics TV , truth-fixing aligns with Born-
fixing. In either case, the agent’s beliefs should be an appropriate convex sum B ∈ B of
Born-rule states.
Ideally, the agent should expect the truth value to be the actual one. We capture this
desire with a condition of strong truth-fealty on cognitive evaluations.
Strong truth-fealty. For all T ∈ T: T = VT .
Given strong truth-fealty, VV = VB. Thus, it is an immediate consequence of Theorem 2
and Corollary 2.1 that, given truth-fixing, all beliefs an agent may have about quantum
objects with vague properties avoid Dutch books, and all and only these beliefs are the
total ones that avoid Dutch books when H is finite-dimensional. Note each T ∈ TV does
not depend on what measurements are or are not performed; thus, vague property states of
affairs applied to classical-realist and dispositional-realist interpretations of P(H) provide
two simple and coherent noncontextual ontologies for quantum mechanics.
Moreover, vague-property semantics given the dispositional-realist interpretation avoids
the measurement problem—there is no question as to why measurements yield particular
sharp outcomes. The partial truth of propositions like “the electron gives rise to an x-
position value in the Borel set a when its x-position is measured” may be straightforwardly
interpreted as the probability the electron does in fact yield such a x-position-value when
its x-position is measured. This strategy exploits the standard interpretation of degrees
of truth in Łukasiewicz logic, viewing P(H) as a similar sort of probabilistic logic (Pykacz
2015). Of course, this approach is silent about how to conceive of classical properties like
position and momentum prior to measurement.
Given its treatment here, the vague properties approach to a classical-realist interpre-
tation of P(H) has the opposite problem: it is silent about what happens during mea-
surement. One of the virtues of the approach on this front is its flexibility. Prima facie,
the ontology offered by the vague properties approach should be easily accommodated by
both relative-state and wavefunction-collapse approaches to measurement. We leave the
development of this narrative for future work.
7 Betting with the eigenstate-value link: a trilemma
For now, we compare vague-property semantics with our two approaches to eigenstate-
value semantics, that with states of affairs TR and that with TE. We have assumed weak
truth-fealty to specify the cognitive evaluations VR and VE. Given this mild assumption,
the defenders of the eigenstate-value link are faced with a trilemma (Figure 3). They must
11Smith (2014) offers a defense of this proposal.
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(VR or VE)
weak truth-fealty
not Born-fixing Born-fixing
for some φ
no beliefs
Dutch books
beliefs for all φ;
VE
VE
VR
Figure 3: A sketch of the trilemma facing the defender of the eigenstate-value link. As-
suming states of affairs TR, the defender follows the dashed path; assuming states of affairs
TE the defender may follow any of the solid paths.
choose one of: not using Born’s rule to fix their beliefs; using cognitive evaluations that
restrict expression; or rendering agents susceptible to Dutch books.
We have already noted that assuming states of affairs TR and weak truth-fealty, we are
committed to cognitive evaluations VR, and these cognitive evaluations restrict expression.
Thus, the eigenstate-value link defender embracing TR is committed to the second horn
of the trilemma. The situation is a bit more subtle for TE.
In Section 6, we postponed the question of how agents should form beliefs given TE.
We address it presently. On the second and third horns of the trilemma, we assume the
eigenstate-value defenders recommend Born-fixing. On the first horn, we assume they
recommend some other strategy.
The defender may embrace this first horn, suggesting that a mechanism explaining
sharp outcomes for measurements may act in such a way that an agent should follow
Born-fixing for beliefs about outcomes, but not for beliefs about unseen objects. A minimal
modification of truth-fixing affords an option that clearly avoids Dutch books. Supposing
c ∈ [0, 1], agents uncertain about the state of a quantum system should choose some
appropriate convex sum of functions in VE; Corollary 2.1 implies that all such belief
functions avoid Dutch books.
But it may be desirable to suggest that the agent stick to Born-fixing in this context.
After all, one may think that an agent’s beliefs about measurement outcomes should
directly inform her beliefs about ontic states. For classical Hamiltonian mechanics, this
assumption seems nearly tautological. Consider an agent who has a degree of belief c ∈
[0, 1] that if she were to look at a billiard ball at time t she would find it to have value
λ for its x-position. She has the same degree of belief that the ball has x-position λ at
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a ∧ b a ∧ ¬b ¬a ∧ b ¬a ∧ ¬b a ∧ b′ a ∧ ¬b′ ¬a ∧ b′ ¬a ∧ ¬b′
1 1 0 0 0 2 2 0 0
2 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 2
3 2 0 0 2 2 2 2 2
Table 1: Some truth valuations compatible with functions in TE.
time t. If the realist wants to follow this interpretive strategy as closely as possible, then
the assumption of Born-fixing is a natural one for her to make. In this light, rejecting
Born-fixing merely to avoid Dutch books seems ad hoc.
So suppose we wish to retain the conservatism afforded by the second and third horns.
Assuming both weak truth-fealty and Born-fixing, we must choose whether c is in [0, 1] or
is undefined.
For the second horn, we note that if an agent should have no degree of belief regarding
indeterminate propositions, then VE = VR. It is not difficult to use the strategy of the
proof of Proposition 3 to show that all beliefs in B now avoid Dutch books. But it is also
clear from our forgoing treatment of VR that these cognitive evaluations restrict expression.
For the third horn, we assume c ∈ [0, 1] and consider the spin properties of a pair of
entangled electrons. Let ρ = |η〉〈η| for η = (0, 1/√2, 1/√2, 0) describe the state of the
system on H = H1⊗H2, where each two-dimensional Hilbert space in the tensor product
contains states describing just the spin of either particle. Let X = {a, a′, b, b′} and let
M = {{a, b}, {a, b′}, {a′, b}, {a, b′}}; for C ∈M, we define
PC := {x ∧ y, x ∧ ¬y,¬x ∧ y,¬x ∧ ¬y}x,y∈C,x6=y, (5)
where, for example, a ∧ b = |a1 ⊗ b2〉〈a1 ⊗ b2| given the following eigenspinors in H1,
a1 =
(
1
0
)
, ¬a1 =
(
0
1
)
, a′1 =
( √
3
2−1
2
)
, ¬a′1 =
( 1
2√
3
2
)
, (6)
and the following eigenspinors in H2,
b2 =
(
0
1
)
, ¬b2 =
( −1
0
)
, b′2 =
( 1
2√
3
2
)
, ¬b′2 =
(
−
√
3
2
1
2
)
. (7)
Note that each PC is a set of four mutually orthogonal projections; we say PX is the union
of these sets. Following Born-fixing, let BBell := Tr(ρφ) for φ ∈ P(H); BBell is susceptible
to Dutch books.
Proposition 4. BBell is Dutch-bookable for the cognitive evaluations VE given
c ∈ [0, 1].
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The proof of this proposition notes that Corollary 1.3 implies BBell is Dutch-bookable
if BBellPX is not a convex sum of the functions in VPX := {V PX | V ∈ VE}, and
proceeds to show that no such convex sum yielding BBell can be defined. If the defenders
of the eigenstate-value orthodoxy should possess degrees of belief about indeterminate
propositions, their beliefs about systems as simple as that of two entangled electrons may
be subject to Dutch books.
Vague properties eschew this trilemma, preserving Born-fixing and avoiding Dutch
books while providing a better guide to the quantum world. The proponent of vague
properties should always have a degree of belief in a proposition that is neither true
nor false, and should thus confidently assert many propositions in which it seems the
eigenstate-value defender should have no degree of belief whatsoever.
8 Conclusions
By extending Kühr and Mundici’s generalized Dutch book theorem to propositional quan-
tum logics P(H) for dim(H) < ∞, we have supplied a defense of a suitable notion of
probabilism for such logics on various interpretations. Our probabilism theorem, like the
classical one of de Finetti, does not apply to probabilities for which countable additivity
and finite additivity do not coincide. Nonetheless, the classical theorem has been extended
by Williamson (among others) to apply to such probabilities by considering infinitary bets
which, notably, still only involve a finite amount of money changing hands (1999). It is
intriguing whether this approach could be extended to arbitrary P(H).
Still, our present, finitary version of the quantum probabilism theorem unifies Dutch
book arguments regarding beliefs about outcomes and beliefs about objects, and it yields
significant results for competing accounts of the ontology of quantum mechanics. It renders
Born-rule probabilities B all and only the total beliefs immune to Dutch books on realist
interpretations of logics P(H) ascribing vague properties to quantum objects. In light
of the trilemma facing defenders of the eigenstate-value link, vague properties offer a
promising alternative.
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Appendix
Our proofs make use of the following properties of sets of restrictions of the functions in
V to a finite set, which we denote by VΓ := {V Γ | V ∈ V} for Γ ∈ L, where L is the
family of all finite subsets of L ordered by inclusion.
Claim 1. If V is pointwise-closed, then all VΓ are pointwise-closed.
Proof. Let V be a set in the Tychonoff cube [0, 1]L (this space has the topology
of pointwise convergence). Pick any Γ ∈ L. All projection functions are
continuous, so by the closed map lemma, if V is closed in [0, 1]L, then VΓ is
closed in the Tychonoff cube [0, 1]Γ.
Claim 2. If VΓ is pointwise-closed, then its convex hull is pointwise-closed.
Proof. Pick any Γ = {φ1, . . . , φn} and suppose VΓ is pointwise-closed in
[0, 1]Γ = [0, 1]n. VΓ is closed and bounded in Rn, and so it is compact by
the Heine-Borel theorem. By Carathéodory’s theorem, co(VΓ) is closed in Rn
and so is pointwise-closed in [0, 1]Γ.
Claim 3. For all VΓ pointwise-closed, BΓ ∈ co(VΓ) for all Γ ∈ L if and
only if B ∈ co(V).
Proof. For the “only if” direction, note that BΓ = V ΓΓ for some V Γ ∈ co(V).
The family of functions
{
V Γ
}
Γ∈L is a net in coV that pointwise converges
to B, so B ∈ co(V). For the “if” direction, note that if f is in co(V), then
some net {fi} in co(V) converges pointwise to f , and so {fiΓ} is a net in
co(VΓ) converging pointwise to fΓ, and so fΓ ∈ co(VΓ). By each VΓ
closed and Claim 2, each co(VΓ) is pointwise-closed. Thus: since B ∈ co(V),
BΓ ∈ co(VΓ) = co(VΓ).
Now we prove our main results.
Proof of Theorem 1. For the “if” direction: suppose either that B is some
convex sum of elements of V or that B ∈ coV. Suppose towards a contra-
diction that B admits a Dutch book. Then there is some set of sentences
Γ = {φ1, . . . , φn} and some vector of stakes 〈s1, . . . , sn〉 ∈ Rn that satisfies
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equation (1). But by V pointwise-closed and Claims 1 and 3, for some (pos-
sibly countably infinite) set of Vj,
∑
j αj(VjΓ) = BΓ for αj ≥ 0,
∑
j αj = 1.
Thus
∑
j
αj
(∑
i
si (Vj(φi)−B(φi))
)
< 0
⇒
∑
i
si
(∑
j
αjVj(φi)−
∑
j
αjB(φi)
)
< 0
⇒
∑
i
si (B(φi)−B(φi)) < 0.
For the “only if” direction: suppose that B 6∈ co(V). By V pointwise-closed
and Claims 1 and 3, there is some finite set of sentences Γ = {φ1, . . . , φn} such
that BΓ 6∈ co(VΓ). Note that b = 〈B(φ1), . . . , B(φn)〉 ∈ Rn is closed and
that, by the proof of Claim 2, co(VΓ) is a closed convex set in Rn. By the
Strong Separating Hyperplane Theorem, there exists a vector s ∈ Rn such that
s · v < α for all v ∈ co(VΓ) and s · b > α for some α ∈ R (where · is the inner
product for Rn); Equation (1) is satisfied for this s and Γ.
Proof of Corollary 1.1. By the Krein-Milman theorem, A = co∂A ⊆ coV ⊆
coA = A. Thus B avoids Dutch books if and only if B ∈ coV = A.
Proof of Corollary 1.2. Immediate from the proof of the “if” direction of The-
orem 1.
Proof of Corollary 1.3. Immediate from the proof of the “only if” direction of
Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 2. E is convex and weakly∗ closed by Bratteli and Robinson’s
Theorem 2.3.15 (1987, p. 53). Moreover, since dim(H) < ∞, E = N , and
∂E = ∂N is weakly∗ closed by Kadison and Ringrose’s Exercise 4.6.67 (1991,
p. 203).
We show that r is a continuous closed map. Recall that the weak∗ topology
on B(H)∗ is the topology of pointwise convergence of linear functionals, and
the Tychonoff cube [0, 1]P(H) has the topology of pointwise convergence for
functions in the space. So note that if A is closed in [0, 1]P(H) and {ωβ} is
a net in r−1(A) that converges to ω ∈ E , then the net {ωβP(H)} converges
pointwise to ωP(H) and so converges to ωP(H) in [0, 1]P(H); thus, ω ∈ r−1(A).
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Since E with the subspace topology is compact and [0, 1]P(H) is Hausdorff, r is
a closed map by the closed map lemma.
By r linear, it preserves convexity. Moreover, r is injective. Note that for every
normal state ω on B(H), there is some ρω such that ω(φ) = Tr(ρωφ) and ρω =
ρω′ if and only if ω = ω′ by Hall’s Theorem 19.9 (2013, p. 424). That is, the
density operator picked out by a normal state is unique. If two normal states
agree over all projections, then they agree over all one-dimensional projections.
Thus, note that ω induces the bounded quadratic form Qω on H:
Qω : H → C :: η 7→ ω(|η〉〈η|) = Tr(ρω|η〉〈η|) = 〈η, ρωη〉.
By Hall’s Proposition A.63, Qω = Qω′ if and only if ρω = ρω′ , and so Qω = Qω′
if and only if ω = ω′ (2013, p. 543).
Injective linear functions preserve extremal points. Thus, r(∂N ) = ∂r(N ).
It is now immediate that r(N ) = B is closed and convex, and r(∂N ) = VB
is closed and is equal to the extremal elements ∂B of B. Thus, Corollary 1.1
completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 2.1. By Kadison and Ringrose’s Theorem 7.1.12, every
normal state is a convex sum of vector states (1983, p. 462). Thus every
function in B is such a convex sum of elements of VB, and so by Corollary 1.2
every function in B avoids Dutch books.
Proof of Proposition 3. For each finite, testable set of propositions Γ ∈ L, the
set of V Γ for V ∈ VO defined over Γ is simply a subset of VBΓ. By Corollary
2.1, B does not satisfy equation (1) for any such Γ, and so B avoids Dutch
books for cognitive evaluations VO.
Proof of Proposition 4. Note that PX contains sixteen propositions and func-
tions in VPX range over {0, c, 1}, so VPX must be finite, and so it is pointwise-
closed in [0, 1]PX . Thus by Claim 2, co(VPX ) is also pointwise-closed, and so
by Corollary 1.3, if BBellPX is not in co(VPX ), then BBell is Dutch-bookable.
So suppose towards a contradiction that there is such a convex sum of functions.
Note that there are sixteen possible truth valuations on sentences in the set
P{a,b} that agree with functions in TE. Table 1 gives the only valuations such
that V (a ∧ ¬b) = V (¬a ∧ b) = 0, along with the implied values for P{a,b′};
these can be deduced from the relevant eigenspinors in equations (6), (7).
Note BBell(a ∧ ¬b) = BBell(¬a ∧ b) = 0. So the convex sum yielding BBellPX
must assign nonzero weights only to functions in VPX agreeing with a row
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in Table 1. Say this sum assigns total weights w1 and w3 to the subsets
of functions in VPX agreeing with row 1 and row 3, respectively. But then
w1 · c+ w3 · c = 3/8 = 1/8.
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